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5 The Cultural and Political Economies
of Hybrid Media Texts
The visibility of mimicry is always produced at the site of interdiction.
—Homi Bhabha
The history of broadcasting before the satellite era is one of
national systems in which different political outlooks and cultural poli-
cies engendered alternate functions for electronic mass communication:
broadcasting was a tool of development in much of the non-Western
world, a public service in Western Europe, an instrument of direct pro-
paganda under authoritarian regimes, or a commercial enterprise in
the United States and elsewhere. National considerations shaped the
broadcasting operations inspired by these various media philosophies.
Considered an important national asset, broadcasting was harnessed to
promote social stability, foster economic development, and consolidate
national unity. In addition to national political and socioeconomic fac-
tors, the limitations of available technology restricted the expansion of
media activities to the conﬁnes of the nation-state. National consider-
ations were therefore paramount in determining the agenda, policies,
and content of electronic media.
A closer examination, however, suggests that broadcasting’s pre-
sumed national scope is in effect an ideal type, not a technically accurate
description of actual media operations. Since most broadcast signals
travel in concentric circles and most countries are not circular in shape,
signal spillover has been historically pervasive. Southern Norwegians
can watch Swedish television over the air, and denizens of the east-
ern Mediterranean receive terrestrial signals of varying quality from
Egyptian and Greek television stations during hot and humid summer
nights. Some countries’ public broadcasters, such as Japan’s NHK, have
committed extraordinary technical and ﬁnancial assets to achieve uni-
versal national coverage of an insular territory that presents enormous
physical challenges. It is also evident that many countries have used
their national media for transnational inﬂuence: in the United States,
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television has been regarded as a global strategic asset since the emer-
gence of the free ﬂow doctrine during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency,
and later formulated as policy byFederalCommunicationsCommission
headNewtonMinow (seeBlanchard, 1986;Curtin, 1993).Nasser’s Egypt
harnessed radio as a redoubtably effective tool for pan-Arab mobiliza-
tion, compelling the Saudi royal family to develop its own broadcasting
operations. Last, cooperation agreements between governments to ex-
change programming have been a recurring phenomenon, indicating
that national media systems are not hermetically sealed entities.
In the last two decades, information technologies have overcome
manyrestraints on terrestrial broadcasting.Theadventofgeo-stationary
satellites, whose orbit is calculated to follow Earth’s movements in or-
der to keep the coverage area, or footprint, constant has decreased the
technical laboriousness and ﬁnancial cost of television coverage. Global
information networks have mitigated time and space restrictions, albeit
selectively and asymmetrically. Faster, less costly, and more efﬁcient in-
formation and transportation technologies have made it easier for com-
panies and governments separated by oceans or landmass to cooperate
on media ventures. The growing international regime of free trade and
decreasedgovernment interventionhas triggered someof these changes
andexacerbatedothers, as statesde facto relinquish theprincipleofprior
consent and cope with a global system based on the free ﬂow precept.
These circumstances have inexorably pushed television’s transnational
and global expansion.
If technologymade the transnational expansionof televisionpossible,
the neoliberalmomentum that peaked in the late 1990s turned television
into a largely deterritorialized, global industry. The deregulation of me-
dia and telecommunications has entailed the withdrawal of the state as
an active manager of national broadcasting, and the concomitant rise in
importance of the multinational corporations that now control much of
world media activities. These corporations themselves restructured to
embrace a post-Fordist modus operandi, as public and national media
systems worldwide were thrust into a liberalization frenzy of privati-
zations, mergers, acquisitions, and vertical and horizontal integration.
This transformation became ostensible in the 1990s, as world television
screens ﬁlled up with internationalized programs, including talk and
game shows, reality television, and music videos.
Transnational post-Fordist practices are the undertow of these in-
dustry trends. As an economic paradigm, post-Fordism focuses on pro-
cedures such outsourcing, subcontracting, multidivisional competition
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and collaboration, and joint ventures, caused by a decentralized accu-
mulation of capital. British ﬁlm and television scholar Michael Wayne
argues that political economists of the media have ignored or dismissed
post-Fordism because it implies that capitalism’s afﬁnity to create mo-
nopolies has been at least partly set back. Wayne (2003) argues that
post-Fordism is characterized by a “discrepancy between the real [eco-
nomic] relations and their appearance forms’’ (p. 84), where industry
consolidation is masked by the superﬁcial appearance of pluralism and
competition. These practices are “transnational,’’ following Danish me-
dia scholar Preben Sepstrup (1990), for whom transnationalization is a
primarily economic process which drives sociocultural change.
Another post-Fordist postulate is a belief in regional markets as a
counterbalance to the power of global market forces (Wayne, 2003).
There is indeed a process of regionalization going on in tandem with
media globalization. While the giant conglomerates—Time Warner,
Bertelsmann, the News Corporation, Sony, and so on—lead globally,
companies such as Televisa and TV Azteca in Mexico and Rede Globo
in Brazil continue to strengthen their positions in and beyond Latin
America. In the much discussed pan-Arab satellite television industry,
dominant companies are emerging amidst a trend toward specialization
and consolidation. The privately owned Lebanese Broadcasting Corpo-
ration and the Saudi-owned, London-published, Arabic-language daily
al-Hayat merged newsgathering operations in 2002, and the rise of al-
Jazeera in the post–September 11 era has stimulated competitors such
as Al-Arabiya and others. In the meantime, U.S. cable company CNBC
launched an Arabic service in June 2003, purporting to bring the won-
ders of personal ﬁnance to the nearly three hundred million Arabs in
the region and the few million Arabs in North America and Western
Europe. The size of this regional audience, in addition to the wealth
of Persian Gulf consumers and the demographic youth of the entire
area, will undoubtedly continue to attract global players in the near
future.
These developments explain why television programs are increas-
ingly hybrid, embedded with signs and symbols with transregional ap-
peal, and executed in line with the imperative of market expansion. It is
important to note that since most emerging regional media spheres are
commercial, modeled largely in line with U.S. production, promotion,
and ﬁnancing standards, cultural dissimilarities within geocultural re-
gions often require extra production and marketing expenses, which by
necessity embed regional processes in global media operations.
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Liberalization and consolidation have also triggered a race to the bot-
tom as media companies strive to reach increasingly larger audiences
without incurring proportionally higher costs. One result has been that
television programs are increasingly designed to appeal to worldwide
audiences, a strategy with considerable advantages. Logistically sim-
pler than coproduction, creatively less restrictive than format adapta-
tion, and economically less onerous than both coproduction and for-
mat adaptation, program internationalization now pervades television
news and entertainment alike, categories that are themselves increas-
ingly blurred. The Cable News Network (CNN) and Music Television
(MTV) are textbook cases, the former in news and the latter in entertain-
ment. CNN launched CNN World Report in 1987, a unique program that
showcasedreportsonvarious countries sent inEnglishby local reporters
working for local stations. Two presenters in CNN studios introduced
the reports, but other than that CNN had no direct production involve-
ment in the content of the program. In the early twenty-ﬁrst century,
executives at CNN International are talking about “de-Americanizing
content,’’ according to Chris Cramer, head of CNN International (“The
One,’’ 2003, p. 73). Between 1996 and 2001, the percentage of American
content on CNN International was reduced from 70 percent to 8 per-
cent, although how to clearly deﬁne what is American is arduous, and
the most direct deﬁnition is content that deals with U.S. issues. Music
Television’s localization—which in realitymeans internationalization—
strategy relies on segmenting international audiences according to lin-
guistic, cultural parameters in their national or regional contexts. This
is conducted through featuring the work of some local artists, hiring
local VJs (video jockeys) to host programs, and overall sensitivity to the
cultural speciﬁcities of the country or region in which MTV operates.
Between 2001 and 2003, MTV launched fourteen new channels, includ-
ing MTV Romania and MTV Indonesia. The total number of worldwide
MTV stations stood at twenty-eight in 2003. AnMTV executive has even
claimed that “[w]e don’t even call it an adaptation of American content:
it’s local content creation. The American thing is irrelevant’’ (“The One,’’
2003, p. 73). Becoming more local is, for CNN and MTV, the surest way
to become more international.
Another result of global media liberalization is the proliferation of
lower-cost, high-impact genres such as the variety show, the talk show—
in both its low-brow and high-brow variations—and more importantly,
the now ubiquitous reality genre and its many subtypes. These genres
have in common an absence or minimal presence of highly paid talent,
low-cost studio or outdoor production, and a tendency toward the raw,
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bizarre, and sensational. In this environment program-format adapta-
tions and coproductions are increasingly common; the former entail the
adaptation to local parameters of tastes and style of a popular program
format gleaned from a different culture, whereas the latter involve a
partnership between several companies based in multiple countries.
Multinational Partnerships and Cultural Hybridity:
The Growth of Coproductions
Coproductions give companies several advantages. Canadian media
economists McFadyen, Hoskins, and Finn (1998) include as incen-
tives for entering into coproduction agreements “pooling ﬁnancial
resources,’’ “access to foreign government incentives and subsidies,’’
“access to partner’s market,’’ “access to third-country market,’’ “access
to particular project initiated by partner,’’ “cultural goals,’’ “desired for-
eign locations,’’ “cheaper inputs in partner’s country,’’ and learning new
marketing, production, and management strategies from the partner.
These beneﬁts outweigh drawbacks such as “coordination costs,’’ “loss
of control over cultural speciﬁcity,’’ and “opportunistic behaviour by
the foreign partner.’’
Joining forces allows companies to share equipment, technical staff
and know-how, and shooting locations. These beneﬁts, in turn, expand
potential sources of funding, including government subsidies and tax
breaks, and also spread the risk, so that different entities share the bur-
den of a potential commercial failure. Reducing risk is also related to
the bigger markets reached by companies that enter into coproduction
arrangements: if a television program or movie fails in a national or
regional market somewhere, commercial success in a different market
will make up for the losses. These considerable ﬁnancial, technical, and
market incentives have triggered a signiﬁcant worldwide increase in
coproductions. Between 1950 and 1994, there were at least sixty-six bi-
lateral coproduction treaties (P. W. Taylor, 1995), and more than two
thousand coproductions took place between 1978 and 1995 (Television
Business International, cited inMiller et al., 2001, p. 85). Television docu-
mentaries and dramas accounted for the majority of coproductions, and
ﬁlm ventures for the remaining 21 percent (ibid.).
There is a distinction between “equity coproductions’’ and “treaty
coproductions’’ (Miller et al., 2001, p. 84). Equity coproductions consti-
tute a strategic and temporary partnership between twoormore compa-
nies, driven by the search formaximal proﬁts andusually not eligible for
treaty status.Aspurely commercial joint ventures, equity coproductions
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do not directly involve issues of cultural policy and national identity.
Many equity coproductions have includedEuropean and Japanese com-
panies contributing to the ﬁnancing of Hollywood movies. In contrast,
treaty coproductions are formal partnerships concluded under the aus-
pices of national governments. This type of coproduction customarily
involves artists, technicians, ﬁnanciers, and the more-or-less active par-
ticipation of government ofﬁcials from two or more countries. As a con-
sequence, treaty coproductions are formal affairs that fall in the realm
of international relations and involve issues of national identity and
cultural policy. Most treaty coproductions come about in the European
Union. According to Screen Digest, in 1998, out of a total of a 183 movies
produced in France, Europe’s largest ﬁlm producer, 81, or 44 percent,
were coproductions. The ﬁgures were lower for Italy, Germany, and
Britain: 14 percent, or 13 out of 92 Italian ﬁlms; 22 percent, or 11 out of
50 German ﬁlms; and 28 percent, or 24 out of 87 British movies, were
coproduced. Interestingly, that year’s ﬁgure was signiﬁcantly lower for
the United States, where only 15, or 9 ﬁlms out of a total of 661, were
coproductions (cited in Miller et al., 2001), in contrast to the 1978–1995
period when 14 percent of U.S. television shows were coproduced. This
ﬁgure during the same time period is 16 percent for France and the
United Kingdom, 10 percent for Germany, and 7 percent for Canada
(Brown, 1995, cited in ibid., p. 86). While the beneﬁts of coproductions
to companies are by now clear, why are governments taking such an
interest?
Striving to capitalize on the globalization of media productions, na-
tional and regional governments have aggressively pursued and fos-
tered coproductions in order to boost exports and broaden ﬁnancial
investment in television and ﬁlm productions. The United Kingdom
is a case in point. In the 1990s the then ruling Conservatives decided
that the cultural industries had to take advantage of “tremendous ex-
port opportunities in a rapidly expanding internationalmarket’’(Barnett
and Curry, 1994, p. 221, cited in Freedman, 2001, p. 3). One of the major
obstacles to British and other television-export strategy is the docu-
mented prime-time domination of local productions in most domestic
markets worldwide. In the United Kingdom itself, for example, Coro-
nation Street remains the most popular television program. Despite this
recognition, British government support of television exports continued
with the rise to power of New Labour. By the late 1990s, Tony Blair’s
Third Way politics explicitly incorporated free trade in global media
products (Blair, 1998). Greg Dyke, who was the chief executive ofﬁcer
of private media conglomerate Pearson before becoming head of the
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British Broadcasting Corporation, enthusiastically advocated a British
strategy for competing in the global television industry. Dyke had made
Pearson a world leader in buying, adapting, and selling program for-
mats. “The trick is,’’ he said, “can you globalize and make it local?’’
(Baker, 1997, cited in Freedman, 2001, p. 4).
In addition to audience preferences for local programs, the entangle-
ment of national and global considerations is another obstacle to televi-
sion exportation. This snag had been a source of controversy since the
1994 publication of a white paper on the BBC, Serving the Nation, Com-
peting Worldwide, which advocated a focus on selling BBC programs
worldwide. In an interview with British media researcher Des Freed-
man in 1997, Harry Reeves, then head of general broadcasting policy,
declared international television commerce to be “very high on the list
of policy objectives’’ and not to pose a fundamental contradiction of the
BBC’s national public servicemandate (Freedman, 2001). In this context,
the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) commissioned a
report to explore areas of improvement in British television exports. The
report, Building a Global Audience: British Television in Overseas Markets
(Graham, 1999), found that the United Kingdom suffered from a sub-
stantive deﬁcit in television trade, and that British dramatic productions
were too slow,dark, or serious,whichhindered their global competitive-
ness, while British comedy was internationally successful. The report
recommended increased liberalization of the domestic British market.
TheBritish example demonstrates the changing relationship between
the state and media institutions, in which the mass media are increas-
ingly treated in economic—contra social, cultural, or educational—
terms, frequently the media’s own economic terms. From regulator and
arbiter, the state has become promoter and cheerleader. The role of gov-
ernment institutions increasingly resembles that of the impresario: they
scout opportunities, expedite deals, and reap a portion of the proceeds.
Using a mix of ﬁnancial incentives and cultural appeals, they facilitate
access to new markets and coordinate pecuniary transnational part-
nerships. Even in program-format adaptations, as the next section will
demonstrate, the state plays a role.
From TELETUBBIES to TELE CHOBIS: The Unbearable
Lightness of Television Programs
The widespread popularity of reality television in the late 1990s ac-
celerated a transnational process of program-format adaptation that
goes back to the pretelevision radio era. Australian media researcher
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Albert Moran (1998) has documented that adaptation as historically
pervasive, and current trends indicate that it is poised to increase as
the television industry continues to globalize. Like coproduction, for-
mat adaptation helps companies reduce risk and uncertainty, in this
case by working with a format with demonstrated success. However,
formats might not be popular across cultural boundaries. According to
Moran: “a television format is that set of invariable elements in a pro-
gram out of which the variable elements of an individual episode are
produced’’ (1998, p. 13), which means that unlike coproductions, where
a program’s intellectual property is jointly ownedby the partners, the le-
gal ramiﬁcations of format adaptation are tricky, and involve the three
legal instruments of copyright, breach of conﬁdence, and passing off
(Mummery, 1966, cited in ibid., p. 15).
L’affaire Tele Chobis demonstrates the problems that can arise in
program-format adaptation and the ill-deﬁned space between adap-
tation and plagiarism. In the fall of 1999, the leading Mexican network,
Televisa, began airing the British and globally popular Teletubbies. Dur-
ing the previous summer, marketing executives from Itsy Bitsy Enter-
tainment, the exclusive North American distributors of Teletubbies, had
been prowling Latin American countries promoting their ﬂagship pro-
gram. Initially, TV Azteca, Mexico’s second-rated television network,
was interested and entered into contract negotiations to purchase Tele-
tubbies. TV Azteca executives changed their minds when Itsy Bitsy in-
sisted that Teletubbies must be broadcast without commercials. While
advertising before and after the airing of Teletubbies was acceptable, the
condition that no advertisements appear during Teletubbies broadcasts
was nonnegotiable and thus a contract breaker. Televisa, on the other
hand, agreed to broadcast Teletubbies commercial free and as a result
purchased the program from Itsy Bitsy. The reaction of TV Azteca exec-
utives was swift and surprising: they created a copycat program, which
they called Tele Chobis. An exploration of the design, promotion, and
distribution of Teletubbies, followed by an examination of the structural
forces and cultural speciﬁcities that have shaped Tele Chobis, provides
a rare vista of the active links that exist between media systems and
textuality, and helps us understand the political economy of hybridity.
Anne Wood, a former schoolteacher and founder of Ragdoll Pro-
ductions Ltd. of Buckinghamshire, U.K., created the original Teletubbies
with her partner, Andy Davenport, a speech therapist. Since its launch
by the British BroadcastingCorporation in 1997, this programhas been a
watershed event in children’s television akin to globally successful
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classics such as Sesame Street. Wildly popular and reaching dozens of
countries, it has triggered references to the four“tubbies’’—TinkyWinky,
Dipsy, Laa Laa, and Po—as the Fab Four, a clear intertextual nod to
Beatlemania. It is also routinely controversial, especially in the United
States, where a slightly modiﬁed version is broadcast by PBS, attract-
ing detractors and supporters from the medical community, religious
leadership, and the gay press alike.1 A typical episode features the four
Teletubbies, chubby humanoids dressed in gaudy colors who live in
an imaginary space of green nature and friendly animals. They sing,
dance, and communicate in a verbal code replete with infantile giggles
and playful body movements. The same everyday life and household
objects appear with regularity during each episode, and simple stories
are repeated several times. The Teletubbies also have screens in their
bellies, used to show footage of real children.
An aggressive and wide-ranging marketing campaign centered on
successful synergistic deals propelled Teletubbies to household-name
status. In December 1998, QVC Inc., the world’s leading “electronic re-
tailer,’’ broadcast a special Teletubbies program, promoting the newly
released home videos “Here Come the Teletubbies’’ and “Dance with
the Teletubbies’’; a music CD, “Teletubbies the Album’’; Teletubbies bean-
bag characters; andmyriadgadgets andaccessories (“TeletubbyMania,’’
1998, December 28). Less than a week later, Ragdoll and Itsy Bitsy an-
nouncedadealwithMicrosoft to createActiMate InteractiveTeletubbies
(“Tinky Winky,’’ 1999, January 6). Two months later, FAO Schwarz New
York hosted an “International Teletubbies Celebration’’ to launch the
ActiMate Interactive Teletubbies (“International Teletubbies,’’ 1999). In
the same year, Burger King’s Teletubbies promotional campaign was so
successful that the fast-food chain found its ﬁfty million ﬁnger-puppet
Teletubbies depleted within less than a month (Morgan, 1999).
These synergistic retailing agreements have made the juvenile quar-
tet ubiquitous in Western popular culture and highly popular world-
wide, triggering a wave of imitation. The Mexican Tele Chobis is not the
only Teletubbies copycat. In March 1999, Ragdoll Productions Ltd. and
New York–based Itsy Bitsy Entertainment Company ﬁled a lawsuit in
U.S. federal court in Manhattan against Wal-Mart Stores Inc. alleging
unauthorized copying. Wal-Mart had been selling Bubbly Chubbies,
Teletubbies look-alikes that shared shelf space with the original Tele-
tubbies (“Teletubbies declare,’’ 1999). Wal-Mart argued that the sup-
plier of Bubbly Chubbies had produced a legal opinion by the law ﬁrm
Buchanan Ingersoll stating that the Bubbly Chubbies “did not infringe
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upon any trademarks or copyrights’’ (“Walmart had,’’ 1999). Less than
twomonths after the lawsuitwas ﬁled,Wal-Mart agreed to remove from
its shelves and destroy the remaining stock of Bubbly Chubbies, ending
the legal feud between Wal-Mart and Itsy Bitsy, who continued legal
action against the unidentiﬁed manufacturer of the Bubbly Chubbies
(“Wal-Mart to destroy,’’ 1999).
Publicity forTeletubbiesalso camevia theU.S. culturewars.TheFebru-
ary 1999 issue of National Liberty Journal, edited and published by the
Reverend Jerry Falwell, former leader of the Moral Majority, carried the
headline “Parents Alert: Tinky Winky Comes Out of the Closet’’with an
article alleging that purple Tinky Winky was a gay character, and that
the “subtle depictions’’ of gay identity were intentional. Falwell report-
edly said: “As a Christian I feel that role modeling the gay lifestyle is
damaging to the moral lives of children’’ (Reed, 1999). This triggered
a ﬁrestorm of controversy in the U.S. and international media. Across
the Atlantic, the BBC sniffed: “the Teletubbies have made the Rev. Fal-
well, chancellor of Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, hot under
the collar’’ (“Gay Tinky,’’ 1999). The BBC’s ofﬁcial response that “Tinky
Winky is simply a sweet, technological baby with a magic bag’’ (ibid.)
seemed to be shared by the press and the public alike. The Washington
Post asked: “Can Mr. Falwell believe that just because Tinky Winky is
purple, has a triangle antenna on top of his head and carries a handbag
that he’s a gay role model for our toddlers? Even Laa Laa, Dipsy and Po
must be shaking their heads indisbelief’’(“SubliminalMessages?’’1999).
Inevitably, the debate became highly politicized. A February 1999
resolution was introduced at the city council in Berkeley, California,
backing the Teletubbies and condemning Falwell’s views, leading Ken
Viselman, head of Itsy Bitsy Entertainment, to call for leaving politics
out ofTeletubbies. About TinkyWinky, Viselman said: “He’s not gay.He’s
not straight. He’s just a character in a children’s series. I think that we
should just let the Teletubbies go and play in Teletubbyland and not
try to deﬁne them’’ (“Calif. Resolution,’’ 1999).2 A few days later, the
March edition of National Liberty Journal carried a front-page Falwell
article in which he wrote: “Until the recent media explosion accused
me of ‘outing’ Tinky Winky as being gay, I had never heard of this
sweet looking character. I certainly have never criticized TinkyWinky in
any way’’ (“Falwell Denies,’’ 1999). However, the conservative reverend
stood by his warning about the conjectural dangers of homosexuality
(ibid.). Needless to say, this controversy added to the already strong
visibility of the program.
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The Mexican adaptation, Tele Chobis, retained Teletubbies’ basic struc-
ture, but offered variations in terms of the leading characters, the story
lines, and the overall content. Instead of Tinky Winky, Dipsy, Laa Laa,
and Po, Azteca’s copycat featured Nita, Toso, Ton, and Tis. Nita wears
green, Toso yellow, Ton blue, andTis dark pink. Both programs are set in
a garden populated with rabbits and replete with toys: the Teletubbies
play on a seemingly placeless green hill and live in a bunker under that
hill; the Tele Chobis live in a house inside the trunk of a big talking tree
that overshadowswhat looks like a pastoral garden. LikeTeletubbies,Tele
Chobis unfolds in the two spaces of nature and technology (see the anal-
ysis of Teletubbies in Lemish and Tidhar, 2001), the former represented
by the garden, the latter by the nine screens on the wall of the Tele Chobis
house in the tree. Teletubbies and Tele Chobis episodes both focus on a
limited number of issues and repeat information about them, in addi-
tion to circuitous story lines that revisit issues several times during each
episode. Also, each installment of both programs includes several famil-
iar objects. For Teletubbies these comprise a tittering baby face framed
in a sun, a hat, a purse, and a vacuum cleaner. In Tele Chobis these en-
compass the commentators Champi and N˜on (champin˜on is Spanish for
“mushroom’’), a sheriff’s badge, animals, and the big talking tree. In all
these aspects, the similarities between the original and the copycat are
straightforward.
Differences betweenTeletubbies andTeleChobis reﬂect the intendedau-
dience. Whereas Teletubbies was conceived as a culturally “neutral’’ text
that could be sold across national and cultural borders, Tele Chobis was
intended for Mexican children. This is manifest in the different place-
ments of real-life children in the two programs. In the British original,
sequences of older children appear on screens in the tubbies’abdominal
areas, monitors intentionally designed as instruments of localization:
different buyers of the program have the ability to insert culturally rele-
vantmaterial in those screens. In contrast, theMexican copycat incorpo-
rates real children in the narrative through parallel editing andmontage
sequences. One ﬁnal difference: whereas Teletubbies is touted as the only
program tohave targeted childrenunder the age of two,Tele Chobis cast a
wider net to include what is probably a two-to-eight age bracket. Unlike
the nonlinguistic blabbering of TinkyWinky, Dipsy, Laa Laa, and Po, the
Tele Chobis Nita, Toso, Ton, and Tis speak a Mexican-accented Spanish.
More importantly, becauseTeletubbieswasdesigned as a “universal’’ text
while Tele Chobis was created for the domestic Mexican market from the
original and now global format,the latter exhibits a cultural hybridity
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that is marked, the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, by incongruent
scenesandcostumes, adiversityofobjects fromavarietyofgeographical
and cultural locations, and ahodgepodge of commercials andpublic ser-
vice announcements forMexicanandAmericanproducts andprograms.
An episode of Tele Chobis ran an hour with six commercial
breaks, three to four minutes (six to eight commercials) each. Typical
advertisers—oddly, not all targeting children—included clothing com-
panies, technical colleges, computer support, snacks and candy, and
Mexican federal government public service announcements on public
health, sexual hygiene, the environment, and social development. For
example, episode 4, which aired in March 1999, began with the Tele
Chobis singing under the talking tree where they live. Then a rapid
montage sequence featured the Tele Chobis dancing and walking on
waterside alleys, alternating with shots of farm animals. After that, we
seeNita, the TeleChobi dressed in green,waking up in a room inside the
tree trunk ﬁlled with television monitors, tall glass panels with water
bubbles, a yellow cupboard, and a big clock above the door. Nita feels
lonely and seeks consolation by talking to the tree. The other three Tele
Chobis are then seenhaving apicnic next to thewater,with trees painted
white about two feet high. The episode’s theme is loneliness, explored
in the context of children who are left at home to their own devices.
We see testimonies from several real children between the ages of six
and three saying what they like to do when they are home alone, one of
them a brown-skinned, black-haired boy wearing an NBA T-shirt. Then
the Tele Chobis are seen, interspersed with shots of children in gardens
and at school, dancing to a song whose lyrics focus on loneliness. Cedar
and cypress trees can be glimpsed in some shots, with green mountains
reminiscent of Teletubbies, but most shots are taken in front of the large
tree trunk that serves as the Tele Chobis’ abode.
The ﬁrst break carried advertisements for Aventuras de Doug (a Dis-
ney cartoon), Hecali clothing, Expertus computer services; public ser-
vice announcement for the Comisio´n Nacional de Derechos Humanos
(National Human Rights Commission) and La Clave (the telecommu-
nications ministry, promoting new phone services); and ﬁnally a pro-
motional preview for the broadcast of an ice-hockey game between
Ottawa and Dallas. After the break we are back to the picnic, and a
phone number appears on the screen with an invitation for children to
call and share their favorite surprise. Nita, Toso, Ton, and Tis initiate a
waterside dance, dressed in snow hats, scarves, and earmuffs. After a
brief interventionbyChampi and N˜on, two tree-perchedboorish animal
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commentators, the scene changes and Ton, the Tele Chobi in blue, comes
in dressed as a U.S. sheriff, dancing to a tune of imitation U.S. country-
western music. The others have red scarves around their necks, cowboy
style, one green, the second dark pink, and the third yellow. The back-
ground is interspersed with typically Mexican maguey cacti, and the
music shifts from Western line dance to Norten˜o (Northern Mexican)
music, and then settles into a hybrid mix of the two genres. After the
dance, the Tele Chobis hug Nita, who tells Ton, Toso, and Tis how lonely
he felt waking up without them. After the second commercial break
(“Presumed Guilty,’’ a soap opera; Marinela chocolate cakes; environ-
mental and public health PSAs; Elektra electronic appliances store; and
a promotional preview for Los Simpsons), one’s imagination and doing
what one likes are introduced by voice-over as palliatives to loneliness,
with a children’s soccer gameproviding visuals for a ragtime tune. After
the third commercial break, colored balloons cross the screen upward
and the Mexican copycat quartet is seen dancing to Norten˜as, whose
rhythm is enhanced by ﬂuid camera movements and parallel editing of
children dancing to the same tune in a school yard.
The hybridity of Tele Chobis is manifest on two fronts. First, the set
includes many markers of Mexicanness. Unlike their English counter-
parts,whose abdominal screensproject footage of children, inTeleChobis
scenes of real children are intrinsically part of the program’s structure,
which belies Tele Chobis’ intended national audience. Indeed, markers of
Mexicanness are many, the ﬁrst of which is the use of spoken Mexican
Spanish. Second, maguey cacti, whose pulp is the raw material of the
quintessentially Mexican pulque or tequila, are prominently featured in
theprogram, often in close-ups.Othermarkers include themonarchbut-
terﬂies, identiﬁed with the Mexican state of Michoacan, a major resting
area for these Monarcas on their seasonal peregrinations, and increas-
ingly associated with Mexico as a country. There is also the Guacamaya
parrot, found in Mexico’s tropical areas. Also, Norten˜o music tunes un-
derscore theMexican identityof TeleChobis. Finally,manyof theoutdoor
scenes are shot in ex-haciendas, whose late colonial architecture is also
closely associated with Mexico. These visual and aural markers—most
of them naturalistic and therefore highly localized—stamp Tele Chobis
with Mexicanness, a hybrid identity grafted onto an original and inno-
vative text, product of the imagination of a British schoolteacher and
promoted by a U.S. entertainment company.
There is, however, a second,more complex embodiment of hybridity.
Tele Chobis’oddmixture of icons, signs, and objects underscores a radical
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intertextuality where foreign cultural elements collide and fuse. NBA
T-shirts, country-western music, sheriffs’ badges, and promotions for
U.S. shows like The Simpsons and myriad Disney productions, point to
the preponderance of U.S. popular culture as a provider of content and
as a source of dialogical connections. Earmuffs, scarves, and wool bala-
clavasworn by the Tele Chobiswhile promenading or dancing outdoors
are also emblematic of a hibernal northern ethos incongruent with Tele
Chobis’ Mexicanness. The iconic mushrooms, balloons, Jeeps, and other
items that swirl vertically across the screen throughout each episode in-
crease the atmosphere of radical cultural diversity characteristic of the
show. The carnivalesque nature of the program comes in full focus in
a scene where Nita, Toso, Ton, and Tis are dressed like medieval enter-
tainers, in a mise-en-sce`ne that transforms their exaggerated baby faces,
protuberant cheeks, and dark-lined eyes into monstrous features.
In keeping in mind the show’s intended infantile and juvenile audi-
ence, these menacing facial traits are neutralized, as the Tele Chobis use
them to scare away insects, especially a bee that is harassing a fright-
ened Toso. At that moment, the voice-over of the tree conveniently in-
tervenes to remind children that insects are good for us and should not
be harmed, and a song “Abejas, Hormigas” (Bees, Ants), praises the lives
of insects and the beneﬁts of insects to humans and the environment.
When a butterﬂy ﬁnally lands on Ton’s arm, the four humanoids are
fascinated and fully converted to friendliness toward insects.
This positive pedagogical turn notwithstanding, the visualmonstros-
ity of that scene, centered on the characters’ physical appearance, is
symptomatic of a radical cultural openness, a carnival aesthetic. As ﬁlm
scholars Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1994) write, following Bakhtin:
“carnival embraces ananticlassical aesthetic that rejects formal harmony
and unity in favor of the asymmetrical, the heterogeneous, the oxy-
moronic, the miscegenated . . . . In the carnival aesthetic, everything is
pregnantwith its opposite,within an alternative logic of permanent con-
tradiction and non-exclusive opposites that transgresses the monologic
true-or-false thinking typical of a certain kind of positivist rationalism’’
(p. 302). Indeed, Tele Chobis carries the cross-fertilized debris of varie-
gated cultural inﬂuences and aesthetic styles. It may have been a copy
of Teletubbies from the perspective of modern copyright—an issue I will
address shortly—which iswhy theprogramwaspulledoff the airwithin
a few weeks of its ﬁrst broadcast. To the cultural critic, however, more
than a violation of intellectual property laws, it is a rich text replete with
signs and symbolswhose intertextual tie-ins subvert the lawsof genre as
Cultural and Political Economies 111
the text itself undermines the copyright regime. Tele Chobis is therefore
an ideal hybrid text, reminiscent of mythological fables, where aesthetic
conventions and artistic practices are subverted, where the monstrous
cohabitates with the sublime and the universal with the particular, and
where the hybridization of cultural forms is not merely an aesthetic at-
tribute of the text, but actually constitutes its texture and pervades its
identity.
Tele Chobis can thus be interpreted as a modern version of the fa-
ble of ancient mythology. According to Serge Gruzinski, a French an-
thropological historian of Mexico and author of the ingenious La pense´e
me´tisse (Gruzinki, 1999), the fable as a genre exhibits “an indifference
to geographical and historical markers’’ (p. 145, my translation) and a
propinquity to embrace disorder and mixtures. Therefore, Gruzinski
concludes, the fable is an ideal framework for hybrid cultural forms. As
a radically open semiotic system, the fable is a creative space where,
Gruzinski wrote in reference to colonial-era Indian paintings in Puebla
and Ixmiquilpan, “a centauress can ﬂirt with a Mexican monkey un-
der the eyes of a Spanish cleric’’ (p. 149).3 Reeling from Spanish colo-
nial control, native Mexican artists during the Conquista used the fable
and grotesque art to effectively subvert colonial aesthetic conventions,
a subversion made possible by the fable’s intrinsic tendency toward the
foreign, the fabulous, and the fantastic. In sharp contrastwith sacred art,
where colonial church surveillance would be intense and the borders
of the iconographic canon heavily policed, the grotesque arts gave free
reign to the imaginative and seditious expressiveness of local artists.
Thus Gruzinski demonstrates that the Indian painters of Puebla and
Ixmiquilpan appropriated a form, the grotesques, originally conceived
in Renaissance Italy, in addition to a native cultural content to create
hybrid images that playfully undermined colonial aesthetics. Gruzinski
sees the same phenomenon at work in contemporary creations such as
PeterGreenaway’sProspero’sBooks,where hybridization “opens theway
for all kinds of appropriations: it pokes fun at ordinary logics, scrambles
the laws of plausibility, of space and time, ignores the laws of gravity,
foils representational conventions’’ (p. 156).
Arguing for a linear historical correspondence between native
Mexican painters of the colonial era, aesthetic innovations in Renais-
sance Italy, PeterGreenaway’s dramatic creations, andTele Chobiswould
be imprudent. However, as products of a world increasingly character-
ized by cross-cultural interpenetration, texts from these different peri-
ods offer more than simple intertextual traces. Like the fable, children’s
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television offers an extremely ﬂexible creative environment, where the
form itself, whether through animated or acted imaginary characters,
is a creation, and the content is allowed license (in the use of language,
colors, forms, sound, etc.) that would not be tolerated in most other
television and ﬁlm genres (see Kraidy, 1998b, for a treatment of this
issue in children’s animated ﬁlm). With its placeless green ﬁelds, out-
landish characters, invented nonlanguage, and heteroclite content, the
original Teletubbies embodies this conspicuous openness perhaps more
than does any other program for children. As a hybrid offshoot of
the already hybrid Teletubbies, Tele Chobis thrusts this radical dialogism
into new territory, where intertexts jostle in a seemingly random dance
of push-and-pull of discordant icons, discrepantmusics, dissonant fash-
ions, and incongruous characters.
Unlike hybrid colonial painting, however, which as Gruzinski (1999)
evinced, survived and prospered under colonial strictures, the textual
excess incarnated in Tele Chobis was curbed by the prevailing system
of reference and power. Today’s global copyright regime, it turns out,
is more successful than the colonial Spanish church in bringing over-
ﬂowing creative energy back into the fold of the permissible. Whereas
Indian Mexican painters indulged in aesthetic subversion, the threat of
legal action by theU.S. Itsy Bitsy Entertainment andBritish Ragdoll Pro-
ductions brought the Mexican Tele Chobis to a quick end: as mentioned
earlier, the program was taken off the air a few weeks after it was ﬁrst
broadcast. This was facilitated by an environment of stricter intellec-
tual property–law enforcement by Mexican authorities in the wake of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and a transitional
period for the Mexican cultural and media sectors.
The Tele Chobis affair occurred at a time of fundamental changes in
the Mexican audiovisual industries, triggered by their increased inte-
gration in global media markets (Lomelı´, 2003) and increasing competi-
tion between Televisa, the leading media company, and TV Azteca, the
creator of Tele Chobis and second in Mexican audience ratings. The back-
ground of these changes was the liberal economic drive initiated dur-
ing the Miguel de la Madrid presidency (1982–1988) and culminating in
NAFTA. This trend continued afterNAFTA, so that by 2000,Mexico had
entered twenty-seven free trade agreements (“Me´xico en el Mundo,”
2000, cited in Sa´nchez-Ruiz, 2001). In the 1990s, both Televisa and TV
Azteca embarked on ambitious global expansion plans. Televisa, which
had expanded into theU.S.market in the 1970s andmid-1980s (Sa´nchez-
Ruiz, 2001), in the 1990s pursued a vigorous international strategy to
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“create a greater dependency on Televisa programming among for-
eign broadcasters” (Paxman and Saragoza, 2001). The world’s leading
Spanish-speaking media company also underwent restructuring, cut-
ting costs by U.S. $175 million in 1997 and 1998 (“Televisa Mexico,”
1999), which caused its shares to rise by 10 percent (“Mexico’s Televisa,”
1999).
TV Azteca was privatized during trade negotiations that led to
NAFTA, and it was purchased in 1993 for U.S. $643 million (“TV Azteca
and Canal,” 1998). Its soon-to-be broadened operations consisted of
Azteca 7 and Azteca 13, two national stations. In 1997, the company
expanded swiftly, issuing U.S. $425 million in publicly traded bonds in
February, and going through an initial public offering of over 20 percent
of capital stock inAugust, alsograbbing32percent of theU.S. $1.4 billion
Mexican advertising market, rising to 36 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 (ibid.). This, in addition to several domestic joint ventures and for-
eign media acquisitions, established TV Azteca as a serious competitor
to Televisa. Notably, TV Azteca’s joint venture with CNI Canal 40 televi-
sion gave it access to nearly 100 percent of the Mexico City metropolitan
area’s 22 million television viewers (“TV Azteca and Canal,” 1998). The
deal entailed TV Azteca’s purchase of 10 percent of Canal 40 shares, giv-
ing TV Azteca wider exposure by adding a third channel to its lineup,
and providing Canal 40 with content from Azteca’s production studios.
In late 1998, TV Azteca clinched an exclusive free TV-licensing agree-
ment with Disney for its “Kids and Young Adults” Canal 7 (“TV Azteca
Signs,” 1998), where Tele Chobis was broadcast with commercials for
various Disney products. TV Azteca’s growth led it to announce that
it would raise its advertising rates by 40 percent starting in January
1999 (Barrera, 1998). That same month, TV Azteca became embroiled
in a dispute with the Chilean government over the way it managed its
acquisition of 75 percent of Chile’s Channel 4 television, and faced al-
legations that it did not comply with Chilean law that mandated top
executive positions in television stations to be occupied by Chilean na-
tionals (“TV Azteca Denies,” 1999). Nonetheless, TV Azteca’s shares
rose 10 percent in December 1999 (“Mexico’s TV,” 1999). Since then,
TV Azteca has maintained its number two position, in effect sharing
duopolistic control of the Mexican media market with leader Televisa.4
Predictably, media liberalization in Mexico involved legal changes.
The Mexican Federal Copyright Law (FCL), ofﬁcially published on De-
cember 23, 1996, became effective in March 1997, repealing the 1963
Federal Copyright Law. In the new law, television and broadcasting
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copyrights are recognized, but “ideas,” “formulas,” and “concepts” are
not legally protected (“Highlights of,” 1998). A few years earlier, the
Law of Cinematography of 1992 repealed a 1941 law requiring that
50 percent of movies be nationally made. According to the 1992 law,
this proportion was to be reduced to 30 percent in 1993, and by ﬁve
more percentiles yearly until it was down to 10 percent by the end of
1997. The cable television industry was also deregulated to allow up to
49 percent non-Mexican ownership (Sa´nchez-Ruiz, 2001).
These technological and regulatory changes, coupledwith increasing
autonomy from government intervention, put enormous pressure on
Mexican media companies to provide commercially attractive content.
Inaddition toglobal expansionand jointventures elaboratedpreviously,
heightened competition led to programming that clashed with prevail-
ing social values, such as talk shows inspired by the “trash’’ talk-show
genre in the United States (LaFranchi, 2000). It was in this environment
that TV Azteca created and launched Tele Chobis, after deciding that it
could neither afford to purchase Teletubbies for commercial-free broad-
casting, nor let Televisa’s acquisition of Teletubbies broadcast rights for
Mexico go unchallenged. TV Azteca thus resorted to program mimicry,
running afoul of intellectual property laws, literally illustrating Homi
Bhabha’s claim in this chapter’s epigraph that “the visibility of mimicry
is alwaysproducedat the site of interdiction’’(1994, p. 89). TheTeleChobis
story consequently embodies a crossroads of historical, economic, tech-
nological, and cultural forces, all ofwhich contributed, at different levels
and with various intensities, to the creation of a hybrid, transcultural
text.
The hybridity ofmedia texts is explained by themedia’s transnational
political economy. Post-Fordist practices and systemic forces account for
the fact that hybrid media texts reﬂect industry imperatives for target-
ing several markets at once with the same program or, alternatively,
are symptoms of commercially motivated “borrowing.’’ In the absence
of the present global structure where interlocking regulatory, ﬁnancial,
political, and cultural forces drive a race to reach the highest number of
people for the lowest cost and the minimum amount of risk, therefore
entailing creative productions that cross and fuse cultural differences,
hybridity would likely not be as pervasive in media texts worldwide.
However, as thedissectionof theMexican copycatTeleChobishas shown,
both the raison d’eˆtre and the kiss of death of hybrid television pro-
grams are to be found in political-economic arrangements, which in
this case included a Mexican industry in transition, embedded in the
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North American Free Trade Agreement and the international copyright
regime. Granted,media texts, even before the acceleration of the sector’s
globalization, have always sought and found inspiration in each other,
as the example of Hong Kong I used in Chapter One demonstrates,
but the contemporary phenomenon of media programs that carry com-
posite aesthetics and fused cultural elements, in both its breadth and
depth, is a product of neoliberalization. Hybrid media texts have the in-
tertextual traces of an increasingly standardized global media industry
where successful formats are adapted ad inﬁnitum, hybridized to cater
to the proclivities of one audience after another, but always remaining
ﬁrmly grounded in the same commercial logic where hybrid texts are
instruments ﬁnely tuned in pursuit of proﬁt.
